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Introduction
After almost ten years since the first summit of the BRICS, still there 
is no consensual definition about the kind of institution that this group repre-
sents. Born as an acronym, in an analysis produced by an international finan-
cial group, versing about emergent economies and their roles in the future4, 
the BRICS earned a political role since diplomatic meetings of these countries 
started to happen, evolving into a structure, still in force, of annual summits.
Initially, the approach between the BRICS countries was guaranteed 
by the mutual goal of changing the rules of the Bretton Woods institutions 
- particularly of the IMF and the World Bank -, in the context of relative weak-
ening of the US and the EU world power, as a result of the 2008 financial 
1 A preliminary version of this article was presented at the XI Meeting of ABCP, in Curitiba, 
in August 2018.
2 Adjunct professor at the Department of Political Science and Graduate Program in Political 
Science, Federal Fluminense University (Universidade Federal Fluminense, UFF); PhD in 
Political Science from IESP-UERJ, Master in International Relations from UFF and Bachelor 
in International Relations from PUC-Minas.. E-mail: roberta.rms@gmail.com
3 Professor at the Department of Political Science, UFF; professor at the Master’s Degree 
in Management Systems from the same university; professor of the Postgraduate Program 
in Public Policies, Strategies and Development of the Institute of Economics of the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ); PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago; 
Post-Doctorate from the University of Washington. E-mail: gomeduar@gmail.com
4 The term BRICS was designed by Jim O’Neill in reports to Goldman Sachs in 2001 and 2003, 
identifying countries with the greatest potential for growth and hence preferential destination 
for the investments of the bank’s customers. According to O’Neill, these countries, particu-
larly China, would outpace developed countries in their relative share of the world economy. 
However, this article will not analyze the BRICS from the standpoint of private financial market 
players, but from its political perspective, emphasizing the diplomatic concertation among its 
five countries.
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crisis. Later on, the summit’s role changed into a broader activity, establishing 
multilateral agreements dealing with themes of economic and social develop-
ment, such as renewable energies, water resources, science and technology. 
Finally, the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Agreement 
were created, building new mechanisms to finance investments in infrastruc-
ture and to support its members countries in case of a balance of payments 
crises.
In this article, we aim to: (i) review the concepts adopted in the lit-
erature to explain the role of the BRICS in international relations and (ii) 
present a new BRICS conceptualization proposal, considering the grouping 
of a transregional advocacy coalition. From the first to the last Summit Con-
ference, the BRICS claimed for a multilateral world order, requesting the in-
clusion of emerging countries in the main institutions of the Western order. 
Over time, the action of the BRICS was deepened, becoming an extensive 
agenda of cooperation, but maintaining its initial claims.
In the following section, the article is organized as follows: in the first 
section, we will discuss the behavior of the BRICS countries in the interna-
tional scenario and in their intra-group relations. We will then review the 
BRICS literature in order to take stock of the interpretations of the nature and 
behavior of the group. In the third section, we will present our proposal to 
interpret the BRICS as an advocacy coalition, based on the empirical contribu-
tions presented in the first section. Final considerations and a reflection about 
the insertion of the BRICS in the global order conclude the article.
The BRICS trajectory: from institutional construction to cur-
rent challenges
The BRICS is a fragile institutionalized minilateral arrangement, 
involving Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This institution5 is 
characterized by the organization of annual summit meetings as well as in-
termediary meetings that allow the definition of joint positions on the global 
political agenda, as well as the definition of cooperation agreements in other 
areas of public policies, which assume a horizontal format typical of South-
South relations.
The recent diplomatic approximation between BRICS countries has 
two dimensions: in Asia, the approximation between Russia, China and In-
5 We follow Simmons and Martin (2002) in their definition of an international institution as 
“sets of rules whose purpose is to govern international behavior.” Institutions can be formal or 
informal (Simmons & Martin, 2002, p.194).
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dia goes back to ministerial-level meetings held in 2001 to discuss security 
issues such as terrorism, trafficking and migration. Since then, there have 
been intermittent meetings on the margins of the UN General Assembly and 
formal meetings. In 2006, Brazil joined the group, responding to a Russian 
invitation (Stuenkel, 2015). On the southern front, Brazil, India and South 
Africa have been on a successful approximation since the turn of the century, 
when the three countries have established common positions in the World 
Trade Organization, in defense of the patent infringement of medicines for 
AIDS treatment6. In addition, Brazil and India led the G20, a coalition of 
developing countries that aimed at countering developed countries - in par-
ticular the United States and the European Union - in negotiations under the 
WTO Doha Round. Finally, in 2003, the three countries established the IBSA 
Forum, which sought to promote concerted and trilateral cooperation on a 
variety of foreign policy issues.
The BRIC was established as an immediate consequence of the Rus-
sian invitation for Brazil to integrate the conversations between the “RIC”. At 
the first informal meeting of the group, in 2006, international security issues 
were left to the background7, prioritizing the identification of common issues 
of discontent about the international financial architecture (Stuenkel, 2015). 
From then on, the BRIC would jointly seek to broaden the G8 and reform the 
decision-making mechanisms in the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, which were benefiting developed countries disproportionately8.
It should be noted that the BRIC countries were not trying to democ-
ratize the decision-making processes of global financial architecture, but 
were just seeking to maximize the importance of their own economies for the 
management of global affairs9, proposing a more plural structure. According 
6 Drug patents are regulated by the TRIPS Agreement, which is signed within the WTO. 
Brazil, India and South Africa claimed that AIDS medicines should be guided by a non-market 
logic, associated with public health and human rights advocacy, which justified the need to 
break these patents.
7 Though they have never been abandoned.
8 The vote of IMF and World Bank member countries is weighted by reference to their share 
of the global economy, leading developed countries to have a natural concentration of power 
in the decision-making process. This asymmetry, however, has become even more apparent 
with the growth of developing economies in recent years, relatively faster than in developed 
countries, which has not been reflected in a new allocation of countries’ shares in the decision-
making process of these international financial institutions. The reform of the IMF’s decision-
making process, which was called for by the IMF, was completed in 2010.
9 A possible demand for the democratization of deliberative and decision-making processes in 
the institutions responsible for global governance would imply the participation of all sovereign 
states, which was not part of the BRICS’ claims.
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to the diplomatic discourse, this new structure would increase the participa-
tion of developing countries in the main decision-making bodies of global 
governance10. In this sense, the BRIC countries would place themselves as 
representatives of developing countries in the deliberative and decision-mak-
ing bodies regarding the regulation of international financial and monetary 
relations (Stuenkel, 2015).
In the context of the 2008 international financial crisis, Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China and other developing countries - including South Africa, 
the future BRICS member - were invited to the G2011 meeting, on Novem-
ber 15 of the same year, in a measure that tried to establish the first actions 
to contain the global effects of the crisis. The G20, although it had existed 
since 1999, gained greater relevance after the 2008 crisis, when developed 
countries agreed that G8 meetings12 were insufficient to address international 
economic problems, recognizing the importance of developing countries in 
international economic relations. In other words, responses to the crisis could 
only be effective if they had the participation of developing countries in the 
deliberative process (Flemes, 2010). The idea that developed countries might 
require the management of global financial relations, imposing their rules, 
was put away.
In 2009, the first BRIC summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia. 
At this summit, centrality was given to issues related to the reform of the in-
ternational financial architecture. In their joint statement, the BRIC called for 
increased representativeness and transparency of decision-making processes 
in international financial institutions (IFIs), as well as stability, predictabili-
ty and diversification of the international monetary system (Damico, 2015). 
They also emphasized the need to continue the Heiligendamm Process, 
which aimed to institutionalize relations between the G8 and the countries 
that made up the so-called Outreach 5 - South Africa, Brazil, China, India and 
Mexico. Notwithstanding the prominence given to international finance and 
global governance, the BRIC also sought to affirm common positions related 
to issues of developing countries, such as food security, energy security, cli-
10 It is, according to Rosenau (2000), a governance without government, that is, of the 
“agreement on the existence of functions that must be performed to render viable any human 
system, even if this system has not produced organizations and institutions explicitly to exercise 
them (Rosenau, 2000, p.14).
11 The G20 is composed of the European Union and 19 countries: South Africa Germany, Saudi 
Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, South Korea, France, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, United Kingdom, United States, Russia and Turkey.
12 It should be noted that Russia was part of the G8.
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mate change and development assistance13.
The second BRIC summit took place in Brasilia in 2010. Financial 
issues kept their centrality, and the countries strengthened their joint posi-
tion in defense of the IFIs reform. The reform of the United Nations Security 
Council14 was also proposed. South-South cooperation began to take shape, 
with meetings at the bureaucratic level - between finance ministers and cen-
tral bank presidents, agriculture ministers, representatives of the national de-
velopment banks and the public security area - and at the level of civil society 
- business forum, think tanks seminar and cooperative forum (Damico, 2015). 
From then on, a type of cooperation organized in three ways, as defined by 
the BRICS itself: (1) the diplomatic level; (2) the level of relationship between 
government agencies and public enterprises; (3) the level of civil society rela-
tionship15.
In 2011, the third summit was held in Sanya, China, when South Afri-
ca’s entry into the BRICS was formalized. The entry of the second largest Af-
rican economy - after Nigeria - into the BRICS caused strangeness among po-
litical and economic analysts: compared to the other BRICS countries, South 
Africa has modest territory, population and GDP. In addition, it was a country 
with no relevant impact or major political aspiration at the global level. From 
the diplomatic point of view, however, the country’s accession to the BRICS 
represented the diversification of its representation among developing coun-
tries, representing a key country in the context of African political relations 
(Stuenkel, 2015). It is also important that South Africa already had established 
relevant diplomatic relations with Brazil and India, which certainly were a fa-
cilitator for the African country’s entry into the group. At the Sanya summit, 
in addition, new themes were included in intra-BRICS cooperation, such as 
culture, education, sports and the green economy (Damico, 2015). Meetings 
were also organized between businessmen, representatives of the financial 
and university sectors, as well as a meeting between trade ministers who were 
absent from the previous meeting16. Regarding the establishment of common 
positions in the different international regimes17, the BRICS sought to estab-
13 Information available at: <http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/previous-summits>. Accessed 
on 12 May 2018.
14 Ibidem.
15 See: <http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/what-brics>. Accessed on 12 May 2018.
16 <http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/previous-summits>. Accessed on 12 May 2018.
17 According to Krasner (1983), international regimes are “sets of principles, norms and 
implicit or explicit rules and decision-making procedures in a particular area of international 
relations around which the expectations of the actors converge. Principles are beliefs in facts, 
causes, and moral issues. Standards are defined standards of behavior in terms of rights and 
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lish a convergent position on the issue of climate change18.
The first three BRICS summits defined the institutional character-
istics that would shape the group. This was, therefore, the first step in the 
BRICS institutional trajectory. It is an arrangement with little institutionali-
zation, without a constitutive agreement, secretariat or headquarters. In short 
terms, it is not an international organization. BRICS allows countries to es-
tablish comprehensive agendas, ranging from the establishment of common 
intergovernmental positions in multilateral fora to mechanisms for trans-gov-
ernmental and transnational cooperation19. At the same time, the absence 
of a binding common agreement, which obliges governments to converge 
their actions around certain issues, allows the “BRICS agenda” to be modi-
fied according to the opportunities of governments at the particular moment 
in which the summit meetings take place. In this sense, points of disagree-
ment are circumvented, inhibiting conflict between BRICS countries, and the 
points of agreement are highlighted (Jesus, 2013, Abdenur, 2014, Cooper & 
Farooq, 2015). However, this form of cooperation means that the permanence 
of the BRICS depends on the relevance attributed to it by the respective gov-
ernments in their foreign policy agendas.
The emphasis given to the BRICS joint positions could be seen in the 
context of the voting of the NATO military intervention in the Syrian con-
flict in 2011. In the vote on Security Council Resolution 1979 UN20, which 
sought to support intervention based on the newly formulated principle of 
the responsibility to protect (R2P), the BRICS countries, with the exception 
of South Africa21, abstained. This common position revealed a convergence 
between these countries not only in economic matters, but also in interna-
tional security (Stuenkel, 2015). Over time, however, the Syrian civil war lost 
relevance on the BRICS agenda, and Russia became, by itself, a major player 
in that conflict (Abdenur, 2016).
obligations. The rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and executing collective decisions. (Krasner, 
1983, p. 02).
18 The links between the BRICS countries, except Russia, had already taken place within the 
framework of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change held in Copenhagen in 
2010. The coalition, called BASIC, argued that newly industrialized countries should not have 
binding targets for reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases, an obligation that should 
only cover countries of advanced industrialization - such as Russia.
19 The terms used here correspond to the international interconnection channels established 
by Keohane and Nye (1977) in their classic discussion of complex interdependence.
20 As a matter of fact, all BRICS countries made up the UN Security Council at that time, either 
as permanent members (Russia and China) or temporary (Brazil, India and South Africa).
21 South Africa voted in favor of the resolution.
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Despite the limited institutionalization of BRICS in its first stage, the 
second stage of its trajectory is marked by the establishment of formal institu-
tions, namely the Contingent Reserves Agreement (CRA) and the New Devel-
opment Bank (NDB), which have mechanisms that generate obligations. The 
second stage of the BRICS institutionalization also expand the South-South 
cooperation agenda, which now covers various topics of interest to national 
bureaucracies and civil society22.
In 2012, the fourth BRICS summit took place in New Delhi, India. At 
this summit, the BRICS leaders stressed their concern about the slowness of 
the IFIs’ reform process23. During the summit, the possibility of creating a 
BRICS bank, that could fund projects of  infrastructure and sustainable devel-
opment, was discussed for the first time. In the same year, on the margins of 
the G20 meeting, group leaders met to discuss the possibility of establishing 
an arrangement of currency swaps. In 2013, during the Durban summit, the 
NDB and the CRA were created, whose constituent documents24 were signed 
the following year, in the Fortaleza summit. During the Durban and Fortaleza 
summits, BRICS leaders met with heads of state from African and South 
American countries, respectively25, (Damico, 2015), in order to broaden the 
relationship between BRICS and the Global South, particularly with regard to 
the diversification of commercial and investment partnerships26.
 Initially, the creation of the NDB and the CRA was viewed with op-
timism among various political analysts. It was hoped that the new institu-
tions would strengthen BRICS not only as leaders of developing countries but 
also as an alternative to IMF and the World Bank (Moreira Júnior & Figueira, 
2014). In this sense, the BRICS would be deepening its revisionism about the 
22 It is beyond the scope of this article to draw up an exhaustive list of South-South cooperation 
agreements signed under the tutelage of the BRICS. For this reason, we only mention them 
at its foundational moment, when we still wanted to affirm the institutional characteristics of 
BRICS.
23 It is important to note that the BRICs failed to support a jointly-named name for the post 
of IMF Managing Director following the departure of Frenchman Domnique Strauss-Kahn, 
making room for the election of Frenchwoman Christine Lagarde. Although it is an event that 
reveals the difficulty of forming a common agenda among the BRIC countries in international 
regimes - and in particular the IMF.
24 An agreement and a treaty, respectively.
25 <http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/previous-summits>. Accessed on 12 May 2018.
26 At the 2017 summit, the concept of the BRICS Plus was defined as a substitute for the 
BRICS outreach established at the first summits to expand BRICS partnerships with the Global 
South countries and to define common positions in multilateral institutions < http://www.
brics2018.org.za/en/brics-outreach>. Accessed on 17 May 2018.
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international order27. Over time, it was perceived that this view was based on 
exaggerated projections. The institutional design of the RTA itself, for exam-
ple, is in line with current IMF standards28 (Cattaneo et al., 2015). The NDB 
is limited to lending to the BRICS countries themselves and therefore does 
not provide collective benefits to developing countries outside the bloc, as 
in the Bretton Woods institutions, which have historically contributed to the 
establishment of hegemony in the post-World War II era. In other words, by 
limiting the benefits of NDB to themselves, the BRICS refuse the prerogative 
of building hegemonic leadership at the international level.
External and internal events in the BRICS countries undermined their 
belief in their high and continuous economic growth, which would be the 
material basis for them to dispute the leading role in the international order 
with the developed countries. On the external front, the end of the commodity 
boom (between 2012 and 2014) had a negative impact on the economies of 
Brazil and Russia, which went into recession. Ironically, the end of the super-
cycle of high commodity prices in the international market is explained in 
part by the decline in Chinese demand, which has adjusted to the new level of 
economic growth of the country, currently around 6-7% per year. Therefore, 
there was an expansion of the pre-existing asymmetry within the BRICS, with 
China and India registering strong economic growth rates, Brazil and Russia 
in recession and South Africa with modest GDP growth.
In domestic politics, there are also important changes which affect 
the definition of the BRICS foreign policy. In Brazil, the deposition of Dilma 
Rousseff led to the emergence of a government linked with the developed 
countries interests, rejecting a natural affinity with developing countries. This 
change became apparent when Brazil and other countries governed by the 
right and center-right in South America (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, 
and Colombia) indefinitely suspended their participation of UNASUR, due 
to disagreements with the left governments, in particular from Bolivia and 
Venezuela. On the other hand, the Chinese government has emphasized ini-
tiatives that reveal the strength of its leadership, creating the Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank and launching the project to build the so-called New 
Silk Road. In Russia, even though security issues have never left the Putin 
government’s concerns, they have been given a new impetus in the context of 
27 The term soft revisionism can be found in Lima (2010), Saraiva (2013), among others. It 
approaches, fundamentally, the discussion on soft balancing that will be discussed in the next 
section.
28 When borrowing from the CRA, countries must commit to providing information to the 
IMF and to subjecting them to the monitoring mechanisms set out in the Fund’s agreement 
(Cattaneo et al., 2015).
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the Syrian war, relegating concerns about the international financial architec-
ture to a secondary level.
In this context, the third stage of the BRICS institutional trajectory is 
inaugurated, marking the present moment: the summit meetings continue to 
be organized annually - Goa (2016), Xiamen (2017) and Johannesburg (2018) 
- and their leaders continue to maintain meetings on the margins of the G20 
meetings. In addition, extensive joint statements are produced at the end of 
the summit meetings - addressing relevant issues of global governance - new 
intra-BRICS cooperation agreements are signed and NDB begins to grant its 
first loans for renewable energy projects, basic infrastructure , and transpor-
tation. However, the initial optimism about BRICS’s elevation to the forefront 
of international relations, with its leading role in the discussions on global 
problems - international financial architecture, humanitarian intervention, 
climate change - does not exist. According to information on the 2018 Sum-
mit website in Johannesburg, BRICS currently has a more limited approach 
to promoting intra-group economic development, which was only part of its 
objectives in its founding stage:
The BRICS approach is informed by the need to deepen, broaden and in-
tensify relations within the group and between individual countries for a 
more sustainable, equitable and mutually beneficial development. This ap-
proach takes into account the growth, development and poverty goals of 
each member in order to ensure that relations are built on the basis of each 
country’s economic strengths and avoid competition whenever possible. 
The bloc provides a unique opportunity for BRICS countries to expand and 
deepen their cooperation in order to significantly advance their economic 
development agendas as well as the agendas of other developing countries. 
(BRICS, 2018)29
 
At this point, it is important to ask: why Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa remain in the BRICS? Our hypothesis is that the BRICS 
provides selective benefits to its members, enabling them to promote South-
South cooperation, while keeping the possibility of reactivating the advocacy 
coalition on global issues open. In other words, its barely institutionalized 
format is a facilitator of coordination and cooperation among its members, 
which, contrary to common sense, encourages its permanence as a minilat-
eral arrangement.
In order to answer the question, it is necessary to understand the na-
ture and behavior of the BRICS. In the next section, we review the literature 
29 Available at: <http://www.brics2018.org.za/en/what-brics>. Accessed on 19 May 2018.
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on the BRICS, seeking to identify the proposals to explain the group by differ-
ent authors of diverse theoretical approaches.
Unraveling the BRICS: revisiting theoretical approaches
Since the BRIC(S) settled as an institutional arrangement, overcom-
ing the prevailing financial perspective coined by Jim O’Neill, extensive litera-
ture was produced to understand its nature and behavior. It is not, of course, a 
regional trade promotion organization, moving away from the regional blocs 
prevailing in the international arena, such as the European Union, Mercosur 
and NAFTA. Nor is there any ideological convergence between the govern-
ments that make it up (Gonçalves, 2014) or a search for making the BRICS 
an international organization (Nogueira, 2015). BRICS therefore departs from 
the more traditional forms of institutionalized cooperation in international 
relations. 
The innovation of the BRICS emergence became the subject of aca-
demic discussions in international relations. According to Fonseca Jr. (2015), 
the BRICS has a dimension hacia afuera, aimed at coordinating the positions 
of these countries in the international regimes and other decision-making 
bodies which govern the global rules, and a hacia adentro dimension, focused 
on the promotion of intra-cooperation30. There are different definitions of the 
BRICS - club organization model (Cooper & Farroq, 2015); coalition (Oliveira 
& Onuki, 2013, Abdenur, 2014); imagined community (Brütsch & Pope, 2013) 
- and about the group’s behavior on the international stage - soft balancing 
(Flemes, 2010); soft bandwagoning (Spektor apud Stuenkel, 2015); subimpe-
rialism (Bond, 2016) - which take as reference different theoretical aspects of 
international relations (neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and construc-
tivism) and social sciences (Marxism).
Cooper and Farooq (2015) classify the BRICS as an informal club. Par-
ticipation in the BRICS is restricted, members define themselves the annual 
summit agenda and the goods produced are exclusive to their members. The 
authors explain:
 
The BRICS are a club that manifests self-selective exclusivity. The exclusiv-
ity of the BRICS is based on the attribution of both internal and external 
status. Internally, BRICS members affirm the status of ‘emerging power’ 
and status assignment derives from peer recognition, which is positive, as 
30 In this dimension, the BRICS constitutes a cooperative arrangement, “involving the 
exchange between the parties of material, symbolic and ideational goods” (Lima, 2010, p.164).
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it reaffirms and reinforces status among members, but can also be neg-
ative, as it demonstrates competitive ambition for power (...). Externally, 
BRICS members design an international status outside their club, which 
is based on the narrative of ‘South-South’ solidarity and is realized through 
their leadership in representing the developing world. (Cooper & Farooq, 
2015: 22).
 Based on a functionalist reading, Stuenkel (2013, 2015) considers the 
BRICS as an institution - albeit an informal one - which composes the set of 
mechanisms aimed at global governance at the same time. With regard to the 
intra-BRICS dimension, in particular, the author argues that financial coop-
eration was the starting point for confidence building between Brazil, Russia, 
India, China (and later South Africa) , expanding it to several other areas. 
These include the construction of formal institutions - the CRA and the NDB 
-, leading Stunkel to affirm that there is a tendency for the institutionalized 
intra-BRICS cooperation to remain in the future.
 Oliveira and Onuki (2013) emphasize the hacia afuera dimension of 
the BRICS, classifying it as a coalition that seeks to “counterbalance the he-
gemonic weight of the United States in the international order”31 (Oliveira & 
Onuki, 2013: 89). Abdenur (2014), in turn, classifies the BRICS as a loose 
coalition, which is embedded in international arrangements of variable geom-
etry and different levels of institutionalization, being present in formal organ-
izations (UN and Bretton Woods institutions) and informal (G20 and IBSA 
Forum, in addition to the BRICS itself). Although Abdenur (2014) rejects 
the idea that the BRICS countries intend to overturn the current internation-
al order, it asserts that the grouping assists China in its counter-hegemonic 
position vis-à-vis the United States, but there is no direct confrontation. The 
author, therefore, differs from Oliveira and Onuki (2013), who consider the 
BRICS together as a counter-hegemonic grouping. Abdenur (2014) also high-
lights the dynamism of the BRICS, which was able to modify its composition 
(with the entry of South Africa) and agenda along its short trajectory:
 
“This dynamism contrasts with the inflexibility of established organizations 
31 Hamilton and Whalley define coalition as “any group of decision makers who participate 
in a negotiation and who make an agreement to act in concert in order to reach a common 
goal” (Hamilton & Whalley 1989: 547). Narlikar (2012) emphasizes that the “collective defense 
of a common position by a coalition is the product of conscious co-ordination, rather than 
a coincidental alignment of interests” (Narlikar, 2012, p.195). Along the same lines, Oliveira 
and Onuki, countries form coalitions in the “attempt to forge coordination of positions in 
international institutions as a way of leveraging the bargaining powers of the member countries 
of these coalitions” (Oliveira & Onuki, 2013, p.89).
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and confers certain advantages on its members by allowing them to engage 
in specific dialogues on topics and to cement ties informally - even by ral-
lying large international events - without committing themselves to a rigid 
alliance. Although the BRICS are a loose coalition, they are not improvised, 
addressing areas as diverse as collective security, financial governance, and 
climate change as windows of opportunity emerge. (Abdenur, 2014: 87).
 
From a constructivist perspective on the BRICS, Mielniczuk (2013), 
while recognizing that the group brings together diverse countries, highlights 
the existence of a shared worldview among these countries, namely the ex-
istence of an unfair global order. This common understanding allowed the 
BRICS countries to establish their own identity, allowing the formation and 
consolidation of the group, which aims to promote substantive changes in 
international relations.
In a skeptical perspective on the BRICS, Brütsch & Papa (2013) evalu-
ate the cohesion of the group against two types of ideas: (1) utilizing a ration-
alist perspective, they seek to analyze the behavior of the BRICS as a coalition 
which aims the emergence among countries in the international arena; (2) 
following a constructivist approach, the authors discuss the possibility of un-
derstand the BRICS as an imagined community, seeking a joint emergen-
cy in international relations while sharing understandings, ideas, and world 
views. For Brütsch and Papa, the convergence of the BRICS countries, wheth-
er around a coalition or an imagined community, is precarious, which puts 
their survival at risk. In summary, the authors believe that the BRICS may be 
no more than a “geopolitical fashion style”.
Regarding the BRICS purposes or its behavior at the global level, 
Flemes (2010) considers that these countries seek soft balancing against the 
hegemonic power, the United States. According to the author:
 
Soft balancing does not directly challenge the military preponderance of 
the United States, but rather uses non-military instruments to retard, frus-
trate, and undermine the superpower’s unilateral policies. Soft balancing 
involves institutional strategies such as the formation of limited coalitions 
or diplomatic entente such as BRIC, IBAS, G3 and G21 to restrict the power 
of the established great powers. (...). It also involves strengthening econom-
ic ties between emerging powers through collaboration in different sectors. 
That could change the balance of economic power in the medium term. 
(Flemes, 2010: 145).
 
BRICS would seek to reform the international order seeking their own 
economic objectives. Hard balancing - as discussed in the Neorealist literature 
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- is not an option for the BRICS, not only because of its (still) limited material 
capabilities, but also because they would not be benefited after a collapse of 
the international order (Flemes, 2010).
Stuenkel (2015), using the term coined by Matias Spektor, considers 
that the BRICS does not present a behavior oriented by soft balancing, but 
by the soft bandwagoning, since they do not pretend to delegitimize the cur-
rent order or to defy US hegemony: the BRICS intends to broaden the deci-
sion-making processes of the IFIs created at Bretton Woods32.
From an institutionalist language, Cooper (2014) and Cooper & Farooq 
(2015) discard that BRICS seeks to compete with the G20, arguing that it be-
haves like a lobby group that seeks to promote its interests within the scope of 
this arrangement. According to the authors, the BRICS is not yet constituted 
as a forum capable of articulating, autonomously, its agency power in inter-
national relations.
Stephen (2014), following a materialistic historical reading, suggests 
that the BRICS does not reject the international order, but only its emphasis 
on liberalism, given that these are countries with a greater predominance of 
state interventionism and, therefore, less sympathy looking for liberal meas-
ures. For the author, the emergence of new powers in recent years has led 
to the deepening of transnational ties, including among the countries of the 
Global South, but at the same time, it has opened the way for the questioning 
of the principles that guide and organize the international order.
Also from a Marxist perspective, Bond (2016) considers that the 
BRICS, and in particular the CRA and the NDB, are an expression of sub-im-
perial finance. The author resorts to Harvey’s discussion of sub-imperialism 
in the current stage of financial capitalism. He points out that the new de-
veloping centers for capital accumulation have sought to shed their surplus 
capital into new spheres of influence. In this sense, the NDB and the CRA 
only conform to the existing IFIs, while the BRICS, as a bloc, only reproduces 
a sub-imperialist behavior (Bond, 2016).
In the table, we seek to summarize the main interpretations present in 
the literature regarding the nature and behavior of the BRICS:
32 The same evidence - the BRICS participation in the G20 and the demand for reform of 
the Bretton Woods institutions rather than their abandonment - is taken by Flemes (2010) 
and Stuenkel (2015) to agee with the mutually exclusive hypotheses of soft balancing and soft 
bandwagoning, respectively.
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Table 1: Interpretations on the BRICS nature and behavior in literature
Theoretical approach Author Nature Behaviour
Rationalism (Rea-
lism)
Flemes (2010)
 
Coalition / flexible 
alliance
Soft balancing
Rationalism Oliveira & Onuki 
(2013)
Coalizão Counter-hegemony
Rationalism Abdenur (2014) Weak coalition Reformism; support 
for Chinese counter-
-hegemony
Rationalism
(Institutionalism)
Cooper (2014); Coo-
per & Farooq (2015)
Club Lobby
Rationalism
(Functionalism)
Stuenkel (2013; 2015) Institution Cooperation and soft 
bandwagoning 
Rationalism / Cons-
tructivism
Brütsch & Papa 
(2013)
Weak coalition; pre-
carious imaginary 
community
Inconsistent
Constructivism Mielniczuk (2013) Political group with 
common identity
Reformism
Marxism Stephen (2014) Emerging powers Answering the liberal 
characteristics of the 
global order
Marxism Bond (2014) Bloc Subimperialism
In the next section, we bring our contribution to the debate on the 
nature and behavior of the BRICS, classifying the grouping as a transregio-
nal advocacy coalition.
BRICS as a transregional advocacy coalition
Searching to further conceptualize the BRICS, we understand that 
the studies of international regionalism allow us to look differently at this 
group of countries, which is based, in synthesis, on a high degree of infor-
mality, which remained in this first decade of existence. Without exagge-
ration, apart from the NDB and the CRA, the only articulation element of 
the BRICS countries is the commitment of their annual summit meetings 
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(Soderdaum, 2016).
Based on different authors, Soderbaum (2016) advocates denatu-
ralizing the neorealist, liberal or constructivist understanding of regional 
organizations, which seems to us to be highly valuable in understanding an 
informal and at the same time relatively structured entity like the BRICS.
Hettne supports the first aspect of Soderbaum’s argument when he 
summarizes the importance of the denaturalization of the creation and 
trajectory of international organizations, noting that “regionalism is more 
complex and often more damaging than simply an instrument to streng-
then an ambiguous ‘national interest’ (realism) or the’ public good ‘through 
trade, development, security and so on (liberalism) “(Soderbaum, 2016: 
53).
This perspective is articulated with poststructuralist and post-
modern proposals in IR, in which the very notion of space is made by 
Nieimann (apud Soderbaum, 2016), who attributes to the less interest in 
regional studies exactly the absence of a discussion about space in IR, tra-
ditionally based on two levels, namely, the state level and the global level.
According to Soderbaum (2016), this leads us to what Neumann 
calls the Regional Building Approach, which comes to understand regions 
through ‘policies of definition and redefinition’ of this intermediate unit 
between the state and the international order, a new perspective which can 
better conceptualize the BRICS.
The trajectory of this unique international entity, which is the BRI-
CS countries, should benefit from the recent contributions of the regional 
studies above, moving away to a lesser or greater extent from the percep-
tions already discussed.
Without any kind of foundational organizational document, the de-
clarations of the summit meetings can be taken as a striking indicator of the 
specific characteristic of the BRICS group: all are initiated with paragraphs 
that reaffirm the link of the member countries with what can be unders-
tood as a group project which is the defense of a reordering of the Bretton 
Woods economic-financial architecture in the direction of a formal and 
substantive democratization of it, including so-called emerging countries.
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa maintained the foun-
ding propositions in the ten meetings, as well as adding new ones, all wi-
thin an underlying principle of consensual action, visible even in moments 
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of in the extra-BRICS foreign policy of the group countries.
BRICS, so defined less by formal, statutory objectives than by a per-
manent self-definition struggle as an advocacy group of emerging coun-
tries, and may perhaps be understood so far as a transregional advocacy 
coalition in transition, corresponding to the policy of definition and rede-
finition of the grouping.
Final remarks
In this article, we sought to conceptualize the BRICS as a transregion-
al advocacy coalition. In order to do this, we reconstructed the narrative of 
the institutional trajectory of the BRICS construction and consolidation, as 
well as to the literature review that seeks to classify the grouping regarding its 
nature and behavior.
In this discussion, we intended to bring our contribution to the role of 
the BRICS in international relations. With no ambition to end the subject, we 
argued that the BRICS must be interpreted in the light of the ideas that artic-
ulate these countries around a common cause. In this sense, we approached 
an interpretive key of the constructivist approach to international relations, 
understanding that the sharing of beliefs, ideas and worldviews is an open 
process. From our perspective, the analyzes which consider the BRICS as 
a coalition by rationalistic lenses (realist or institutionalist) can not explain 
the reason why such diverse countries have met and still persist despite eco-
nomic33  and political34 crises experienced by its members. To understand the 
nature and behavior of the BRICS, it becomes necessary to understand how 
its facet as a cooperative arrangement articulates with its definition as a coa-
lition (or lobby group). For us, the advocacy coalition model brings important 
contributions to understanding this articulation.
All this characterization of a “transregional advocacy coalition” gives 
meaning to the own characteristics of the BRICS formation and action. On 
one hand, it is marked by an affirmation of a founding principle, to which 
are associated other unfoldings related to that founding idea in response to 
the external scenario (of the group) in transformation during its first decade 
of existence, without losing its identity. On the other hand, this performance 
is based on an intense and diversified bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
between member countries - typical of South-South relations, moving away 
33 Brazil and Russia.
34 Brazil and South Africa.
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from any hierarchy between donor and recipient, strengthening bilateral and 
multilateral relations which are established within the BRICS.
In this way, the BRICS affirms itself as a new form of concerted inter-
national action by a group - more than a group - of countries with an impor-
tant impact on the concert of nations, regardless of whether it constitutes a 
“consolidated” international organization or not (Soderbaum, 2016).
Last but not least, it should be added that an empirical challenge for 
the BRICS, and for Brazil in particular, was the deposition of Dilma Rousse-
ff and the rise of the Michel Temer government, which has implemented a 
neoliberal economic agenda and established as a priority of Brazilian foreign 
policy the North / South relations. Although Brazil remains in the BRICS, 
its leadership in articulating the demands and ideas common to the Global 
South has collapsed. In this context, Brazil’s participation in the BRICS has a 
low profile, and contacts are maintained at the bureaucratic and civil society 
levels, but with a shy support of the government regarding its goals to reform 
global governance institutions.
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ABSTRACT
In this article, we aim to: (i) review the concepts adopted in the literature to explain 
the nature and behavior of the BRICS in international relations and (ii) present a new 
BRICS conceptualization proposal. From the first to the last Summit Conference, 
the BRICS explicitly advocates a multilateral world order through the inclusion of 
emerging countries in the base institutions of the Western order. For the elaboration 
of the article, we review the literature on BRICS, as well as the approach on region-
alism proposed by Soderbaum to elaborate our conceptualization of the BRICS as an 
advocacy coalition.
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